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Abstract--Dynamic rent-seeking games with nonlinear cost functions are analyzed. The local 
asymptotic stability of the solution is first examined. We show that in the absence of a dominant 
agent, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian are real. Conditions are given for the local asymptotic stability 
as well as for the local instability of the equilibrium. In the presence ofa dominant agent, complex 
eigenvalues are possible. Simple stability conditions ave presented for cases when all eigenvalues 
are real, and the possibility of limit cycles is analyzed in the case of complex eigenvalues. (~) 2001 
Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cournot oligopolies are one of the most frequently studied models in mathematical economics 
since the middle of the nineteenth century, when the classical work of Cournot [1] was published. 
The major research areas have included the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, the 
asymptotic properties of the equilibrium in dynamic oligopolies, as well as different variants and 
extensions of the classical model of Cournot. A comprehensive summary of the most important 
research findings on single-product models can be found in [2], and the corresponding multi- 
product models are discussed in [3[. The extended research on oligopoly models has included 
group-equilibrium problems [4], labor-managed oligopolies [5], oligopsonies [6], multistage [7] and 
hierarchical models [8]. 
During the last two decades, increasing attention has been given to the analysis of rent-seeking 
games. The introductory paper of Tullock [9] has initiated a series of studies on the subject. A 
typical example of a rent-seeking ame could be the process of applying for franchises, e.g., of 
well-known hamburger chains; these continually come up for renewal, and individuals wishing to 
bid for these typically would use professional bidding agents who could be viewed as the agents 
of our model. The basic model can be formulated in the following way. 
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Assume that n agents compete for a rent, which will earn a unit profit for the agent who 
actually wins the rent. Let xi denote the effort agent i spends in order to win the rent, and let 
X n ci(xi) be its cost. The probability of winning the rent for agent i is i/(:~-~j=l xj), and therefore, 
its expected profit is given as 
ci(xi). (1) n 
j= l  
Let Xi = ~+ be the set of feasible fforts of agent i; then an n-person oncooperative normal-form 
game F -- {n, X l , . . .  , Xn,  ~1, . . . ,  ~n} is formally defined, and is called a rent-seeking ame in 
which the agents are the players, and Xi and ~i are the strategy set and payoff unction of agent i 
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,  n). The existence of equilibrium of this game has been analyzed by several authors. 
Decreasing returns in rent-seeking technology as well as increasing returns were analyzed in [10] 
where the possibility of the agent's reaction function to be upward sloping was also examined. 
A systematic approach to establish the existence of an equilibrium has been also offered in this 
paper. Okuguchi [11] has pointed out that rent-seeking games are mathematically equivalent 
to profit maximizing Cournot oligopolies with hyperbolic price functions. He also proved the 
existence of a pure symmetric Nash equilibrium, when the agents have identical cost functions. 
These results have been extended to the nonsymmetric case in [12], where the existence of a 
unique equilibrium is proved with convex cost functions. The existence and uniqueness of the 
equilibrium in rent-seeking games is not implied by the corresponding results on the classical 
Cournot model, since the strategy sets are not compact and hyperbolic price functions are not 
concave. Therefore, model-oriented special methods have had to be developed. 
The dynamic extension of rent-seeking games has been first examined in [13] and later in [14], 
where the stability of the equilibrium was proved under certain convexity and monotonicity 
conditions. However, these conditions are not always satisfied for an important class of rent- 
seeking ames. Therefore, a more general, systematic approach is needed to describe stability 
conditions, and such is the aim of this paper. 
There is no previous tudy investigating unstable quilibria nd asymptotic behaviour that is 
more complex than asymptotical stability for rent-seeking games. Such study has been performed 
only for the classical Cournot model in [15] and [16] based on bifurcation theory. It is worth 
mentioning here that the types of dynamical systems we encounter below (as well as those in [15] 
and [16]) are not unrelated to those encountered in population dynamics in mathematical biology. 
In this regard, the monograph [17] provides an excellent summary of the relevant mathematical 
results and techniques. 
This paper will provide a systematic stability analysis of rent-seeking games as well as consider 
the conditions under which the dynamics of such games can give rise to the birth of limit cycles. 
2. THE DYNAMIC  MODEL 
The existence of equilibrium is usually examined by determining the best response functions 
of each player and investigating its analytic properties. For each agent i, denote Qi -- ~j#~ xj. 
For each Qi ~ 0, the best response of agent i can be obtained as 
xi(Qi) = argmax ~-  x~ t x~>o ( xi ÷ Qi ci(xi) • (2) 
We assume that for each agent i, the cost function ci is twice continuously differentiable. If
xi(Qi) > 0, then the first- and second-order conditions can be written as 
- = 0, (3) + Q )2 
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and 
-2Q~ 
- c~'(x,(Qd) < O. (4) 
Notice that relation (4) also guarantees that the left-hand side of equation (3) is strictly mono- 
tonic, and therefore, for each Qi the quantity xi(Qi) is unique, and hence, xi(Qi) is a properly 
defined function. 
Let now (Xl,.. .  ,x~) be a positive equilibrium that satisfies both the first- and second-order 
?I 
conditions (3) and (4). Thus, with the notation Q~ = Y~4~ ~z and ~ = y'~j=~ .j, the first-order 
condition (3) may be rewritten as 
O, = ~'~(~)~2, (5) 
whilst the second-order condition (4) may be expressed as 
C,, {:~ .~ --2(~i 
i ~ *J > 7" -  (6) 
We can easily show that the last two relations characterise the equilibrium efforts and cost 
derivatives• Select any arbitrary positive numbers Xl,.. , xn, and form the quantities g = Y~,=I i 
and (for all i), Qi = Y~4¢~xl • In addition, select any sequence ~{,... ,~  of real numbers that 
satisfy inequality (6)• Then, there is a rent-seeking game in which (Xl,-. . ,  2~) is an equilibrium 
and for all i, c~'(£i) -- ~', since for each i there is a strictly increasing cost function with given 
first and second derivatives at a single point. 
Assume next that the time scale is continuous, and at each time period t > 0, each agent 
adjusts its effort proportionally to its marginal profit• The resulting dynamic model has the form 
Q' - c~(zd) (7) z i  = ki (xi + Qi)  2 
where ki > 0 is given for each i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n. The value of ki shows how fast agent i follows the 
profit changes. In the economic literature, ki is usually called the speed of adjustment. Notice 
that any positive equilibrium (e l , . . .  ,xn) is an equilibrium of this dynamic system as well as 
the consequence of the first-order conditions (5). Assume that the initial vector x(0) is selected 
from a neighbourhood of this equilibrium. In the following sections, the local stability and the 
dynamic behaviour of the solution trajectory x_(t) will be investigated. 
3. STABIL ITY  ANALYS IS  
In order to analyze the local asymptotic behavior of the solution of the dynamical system (7), 
its Jacobian at the equilibrium J has to be first determined. Simple differentiation shows that 
at the equilibrium 
kl (-2(~1 - S3Clt(Xl)) 
J=~ 
1 
= ~ (D + aV) ,  
kl (:~1-(~1) "'" kl (X l - (~1)  ] 
/ • ' ' .  i 
- -3  t/ - k,~ (~,~ - On)  . . .  k,~ ( -2Q, ,  - ~ ~,~(~,~)) J 
(8) 
with 
__D = diag (ki ( -~  - ~3c I ' (~1) ) , . . . ,  k~ ( -~ - ~3c , (~) ) ) ,  
_a= (kl (ff:l -Q1)  ,•..,kn (~n - (~n)) T , and _1 T = (1, . . .  ,1)• 
(9) 
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Since the signs of the real parts of the eigenvalues determine the asymptotic behavior of the 
solution, we ignore the positive factor 1/~ 3. The characteristic polynomial of D + _al T can be 
written as 
det (D - A /+ _al -c) = det(D - A/) det ( /+  (D - ~_/)- la_ll-) 
= fi (ki ( -~-~3c: ' (~ i ) ) -A )  1+ ~ ki ($--_~-~-q~-7(-~-.)) _ A . 
i=1 i=1 
(10) 
In order to simplify the notation, let di = ki(-~-$3c~'(2i))  and ei = k i (2 i -Q i )  for i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,  n, 
and assume that the different di values are numbered so that dl < d2 < .-. < d~. Let It denote 
the set of agents with. the same dt value (1 = 1, 2 , . . . ,  r), and let mt denote the number of agents 
in set Il. Then, the eigenvalues are the solutions of the equation 
^/t = 0, (11) I'I(dt- A) "~' 1 + dt- A 
l= l  = 
where "Yl = ~iez~ ei. The eigenvalues can be obtained in the following way. If ml > 1, then 
A = dl is an eigenvalue with multiplicity mt - 1, and if mt= 1, then the corresponding factor 
cancels, so in this case A = dt is not an eigenvalue (l = 1, 2 , . . .  ,r). In this way, we have 
ml + .. .  + mr - r - n - r eigenvalues (included with multiplicities). The other eigenvalues are 
the solutions of the nonlinear equation 
7----L--I = O. (12) I + ~ t A 
/=I 
Since this is equivalent to a polynomial equation of degree r, it has r real (or complex) roots. 
The foregoing discussion may be summarized in the following theorem. 
THEOREM 1. 
(i) Assume that with some l, ml >_ 2 and dl > O. Then, the equilibrium is locally unstable. 
(ii) Suppose that for all l such that mz k 2, dl < 0. Let A1,...,A~ denote the roots of 
equation (12). 
I f  for at least one i, 
Re Ai > 0, (13) 
then the equilibrium is locally unstable. I f  for all i, Re)h < 0, then the equilibrium is locally 
asymptotically stable. 
We note that in the second case of Theorem 1 when for all roots, Re fli _~ 0 and for at least 
one root Re Ai = 0, no conclusion can be given based only on analysis of the eigenvalues, ince 
the system is nonlinear. In order to apply the above theorem, the locations of the roots of 
equation (12) should be determined. We will consider two major eases. 
CASE A. Assume that for all l, 
7l -< 0. (14) 
Notice that if for some 1 the value of 71 is zero, then the corresponding term is missing from 
the left-hand side of equation (12) without changing its structure. Therefore, in the following 
discussion we may assume that inequality (14) is strict for all I. Introduce the function 
7, (15) 
l= l  
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Figure 1. The shape of g(A) in Case A. 
It  is easy to see that 
lim g(A) -- c~, lim g(A) = -c~,  ~h~oog(A ) = 0, and g'(A) < 0, (16) 
~--*d l~0 )~--*d l - -0  
for all )~, except at the poles. The graph of g(),) is illustrated in Figure 1. Since equation (12) can 
be written as g(,k) = -1 ,  we see that all roots are real: one before dl, and one between each di 
and di+l (i = 1 ,2 , . . . , r -  1). 
Hence, we may state the following result. 
TItEOREM 2. Consider the case in which "Yl <- 0 for all l. 
(i) I f  for all l, dl <_ O, then a11 roots are negative implying the local asymptotic stability of 
the equilibrium. 
(ii) Assume that dr > 0 and all di < 0 (i = 1,2, . . .  , r -  1). If g(O) < -1,  then the equilibrium 
is locally asymptotically stable, and if g(O) > -1, then the equilibrium is locally unstable. 
(iii) If dr > 0 and dr-1 >_ 0, then the equilibrium is locally unstable regardless of the signs of 
the other di values (i =- 1, 2 , . . . ,  r - 2). 
We note again that in the case when the largest root is zero, no conclusion can be given, since 
the system is nonlinear. 
CASE B. Suppose that for some l*, 
> 0. (17) 
We first show that this relation can hold for only one value of l*. Notice, first, that there is at 
most one dominant agent p such that ~p > Op. If set Ia does not contain this agent, then 
i E Ia  
174 C. CHIARELLA AND F. SZIDAROVSZKY 
showing that agent p must belong to set Iz*. We show next that necessarily dr* < 0. The 
second-order conditions (6) imply that for the dominant agent p, 
- < - *  + 2G = G - 
and by multiplying this inequality by kp we have 
d,.  = kp < k .  (G  - = -e ,  
Since for all other agents i E h*, ei _< 0, we see that 
dr. < - 2_, ei = -V l *  < 0. (18)  
iEI~. 
For the sake of simplicity assume that l* = r. We still keep the assumption that dl < d2 < 
• .' < dr - l ,  and note that now dr is not necessarily the largest among the dL values. In this case, 
function g satisfies the following properties: 
lim g(A)= cv, lim g(A)=-~,  
A---*dl +0 A---*d1-0 
lim g(A)=-oc ,  lim g(A)=oo,  
A---*d~+0 A--~d,.-O 
l=  1 ,2 , . . . , r - l ,  
(19)  
and 
lira g(A) = 0. 
A-*q-co 
Notice that no condition can be given on the sign of the derivative f (A)  in this case. The shape 
of function g is illustrated in Figure 2, where dr is either the largest, or the smallest among the dt 
values, or it is in the middle. 
The above discussion allows us to state the following. 
THEOREM 3. Consider the case in which 7l* > 0 for some l*. 
(i) Assume first that dr > dl (l = 1, 2 , . . . ,  r - 1). I f  dr >_ O, then the equilibrium is unstable. 
If dr < O, then in the case of g(O) > -1  the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable, 
and if g(O) < -1, the equilibrium is locally unstable. 
(ii) Assume now that dr < dz (1 = 1, 2, . . .  , r  - 1) and there are real roots between dr and dl. 
If dr-2 >_ 0, then the equilibrium is unstable. If dr-2 < 0 < dr-l ,  then in the case 
of g(O) < -1  the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable, and if g(0) > -1 ,  the 
equilibrium is locally unstable. If dr_l <_ O, then the equilibrium is locally asymptotically 
stable. 
(iii) Assume next that dr-2 < dr < dr - l ,  and there are real roots between dr-2 and dr-1. 
I f  dr-2 >_ O, then the equilibrium is locally unstable. I f  dr-2 < 0 < dr- l ,  then in 
the case when the roots between dr-2 and dr-1 are negative, the equilibrium is locally 
asymptoticedly stable, and if at least one root between dr-2 and dr-1 is positive, the 
equilibrium is locally unstable. I[ dr-1 <_ O, then the equilibrium is locally asymptotically 
stable. 
(iv) Assume, finally, that di-1 < dr < di with some i < r - 2, and there are real roots between 
di-1 and di. If dr-2 > O, then the equilibrium is locally unstable. If dr-2 < 0 < dr- l ,  
then in the case of g(O) < -1 the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable, and if 
g(0) > -1,  the equilibrium is locally unstable. If dr-I <_ O, then the equilibrium is locally 
asymptotically stable. 
Notice that the theorem does not apply for cases when the largest real root is zero or there 
are no roots in the intervals indicated. In every case there are always (r - 2) real roots, and 
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Figure 2. The shape of g(A) in Case B. 
therefore, either all roots are real, or there is exactly one complex conjugate pair of roots. 
next example shows that  both possibilities might occur. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the special case when r = 2, kl = k2  - -  1,  d2  - -  -1 ,  dl = 0. 
2£2 - -  $ = 3' > 0 be a parameter. From equation (18) we must have ~ < 1. Furthermore, 
231 - -  m18 = 2(3 - x2) - m18 = - (mi  - 2)3 - 2;~2 = - (mi  - 1)3 - V. 
The 
Let 
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By introducing the notation c~ ---- (ml  - 1)$ we see that a can take on any nonnegative value. 
Then, equation (12) has the form 
which simplifies as 
The discriminant is 
-a  - 7 + 7 _ -1 ,  
O-A -1 -A  
A 2 + A(I + a) + (a + 7) = 0. 
D = (1 +a)  2 - 4(a +7)  = (1 - a)2 _ 47, 
showing that the cases of both real and complex roots are possible. | 
We have seen in the above discussion that Case B may occur only in the case of a dominant 
agent such that 2p > Qp. This inequality shows that at the equilibrium, agent p spends more 
effort than all other agents combined. In the case of an asymptotically stable equilibrium, this 
is the case for all t large enough. This assumption is therefore not very realistic, since antitrust 
constraints usually prohibit this kind of behaviour in the long run. 
4. THE EMERGENCE OF  L IM IT  CYCLES 
We have seen in the previous section that there are many plausible situations in which the 
equilibrium of the rent-seeking ame may be locally unstable. The question arises as to what 
is the fate of the dynamic rent-seeking ame in such situations. One possibility is that the 
outcome of the game cycles around the equilibrium. This could, for instance, be the case if 
the speeds of reaction, ki, are relatively large so that there is continual overshooting of the 
equilibrium. Such could be the situation in the case of a locally unstable quilibrium if we could 
demonstrate the existence of limit cycle motion by applying the Hopf bifurcation theorem (see, 
for example, [18]). To this end we need to determine the regions in the parameter space where 
pure complex eigenvalues exist. Letting A = is,  then equation (12) has the form 
r -1  
7~ + 7~ - 1, (20) 
l=1 
where 7z < 0 (i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,  r - 1), and % > 0. By equating the real and imaginary parts, we have 
r--1 7tdl 7rdr r--1 71i(~ 7r i~ 
d 2 + a - - - - -~  + d~ + c~ --------~ - -1 ,  and ~ d 2 + a - - - -~  + d~ + (~-----~ = O. (21) 
l=l 1=1 
Since we assume that a ¢ 0, the second equation implies that 
r--1 
71 (22) 7r  =-  + + 
/=1 
and combining this relation with the first equation of (21) leads to a simple equation for (~ 
r -1  7 l (d i  - d r )  
l= l  
Notice that this is a polynomial equation of degree r - 1 for (~2, which can be solved by routine 
methods (see, for example, [19]). Notice that in case (i) of Theorem 3, the left-hand side is always 
positive, so no real root exists. This observation coincides with the corresponding results when 
we saw that all roots of equation (12) are real, so no pure complex root exists. The existence of 
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real roots in equation (23) depends on the signs and the orders of magnitudes of the differences 
d l -  dr. The following example il lustrates the possibility of real roots and hence the possibil ity 
of l imit cycles. 
EXAMPLE 2. Consider the case of r = 3, 71 = -a ,  72 = -b  (where a and b are positive 
parameters) ,  73 ----- 7 > 0 is the bifurcation variable, and dl = -2 ,  d2 = 1, d3 -- -1 .  Then, 
equation (20) has the form 
-a  -b  7 
-2  ------~ + ~ + -1-- - A -- -1 .  (24) 
If  A = ia,  then 
-a  -b  7 
-2  - i - - - - - -~ + 1 ---Z-~a + -1  - i - - - - --a - -1 .  
Equat ing the real and imaginary parts, 
2a -b  -7  
4 + a------5 + ~ + 1 + a----- 5 - -1 ,  
and 
-a ia  -b ia  v ia  
- - +  - - +  - -  -0 .  4A-(~ 2 l+gr  2 1+a 2 
Notice that  we are interested in the case of a ~ 0. So, solving both equations for 7/ (1 + a2), we 
ger~ 
7 2a b a b 
I+OL 2 -- 4 + a-------- ~ 1 + a--------~ + 1 = 4 + a2 + 1 + a--------~. (25) 
A fourth-order equation is therefore obtained for a 
a 4 + a2(5 + a -- 2b) + (4 + a - 8b) = 0. (26) 
Notice that  this equation will have positive roots if 4 + a -8b  < 0. In order to satisfy relation (18), 
we have to guarantee that  7 < 1, that  is, 
7 a b 1 
l+a  2 4+c~ 2 1A-oL 2 l+a2 '  
which can be rewritten as 
a2(a+b - 1) < 4 -a -4b .  
For example, by selecting a -- 0.15, b -- 0.75, this inequality is satisfied for all a 2 > 0; furthermore, 
from equation (26) we have 
a 2 ~ 0.451, and a 2 ~ -4.101, 
from which we see that  the real roots are 
al,2 ~ ±0.672. 
Subst itut ing these values into equation (25), we see that  7 ~ 0.799. By differentiating equa- 
tion (24) with respect to 7, we have the derivative value 
dA 1/(1 + A) 
d7 -a / ( -2 -  A) 2 - b/(1 - A) 2 +7/ (1+ A) 2' 
which has the approximat ing value (0.468 + 0.719i) at A = ia  with the above values of a and 7. 
Hence, the real part  is nonzero showing the existence of a limit cycle. | 
We have established the possibil ity of limit cycle motion in the case of local instability. Our 
analysis does not enable us to say anything about the stabil ity of such limit cycles. In order 
to do so, we would need to specify in some detail the nonlinear structure of the dynamic rent- 
seeking game and apply normal form theory (see [18]). However, very often these calculations 
are intractable and it becomes necessary to resort to numerical methods as in [15]. Such analysis 
warrants a paper in its own right, and we leave this task for future research. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, nonlinear rent-seeking ames were analyzed where the cost functions were as- 
sumed to be nonlinear. A dynamic adjustment process in which each agent adjusts its output 
proportional ly to its marginal profit was examined. The local asymptotic stability of the equi- 
librium was first examined. In the absence of a dominant agent, it turns out that  all eigenvalues 
are real. Conditions for the local asymptotic stability and also for the local instability of the 
equilibrium were then derived. In the presence of a dominant agent, complex eigenvalues are 
also possible. Simple conditions were presented for the stability and also for the instability of 
the equilibrium in the case of real eigenvalues. If complex eigenvalues are possible, then we have 
shown the possibility of limit cycles via the use of the Hopf bifurcation theorem. 
Future research could focus on the specific nature of nonlinearities and analyse the stability of 
the limit cycle motion that emerges when the equilibrium becomes locally unstable. A further 
avenue of research would be how agents come to learn the optimal effort of all other agents. Here, 
we have assumed that  each agent knows instantaneously the optimal effort of all other agents. 
However, it would be more realistic to assume that  this is learnt with some time delay. Such 
learning could, for example, be modelled using the continuously distributed lags employed in [15] 
and [16] to analyse such learning in oligopoly models. 
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